Russia and China have no qualms about going low to gain an advantage over the United States — and now they’re going even lower, targeting subsea cables that carry the vast majority of our and our allies’ internet traffic, phone calls and trillions of dollars’ worth of financial transactions daily.
Over the past several months both Moscow and Beijing, seeking to disrupt and intimidate the West, have intensified their attacks on undersea infrastructure, forcing the United States and its allies and partners to protect these critical connections.
Perceiving themselves in a long-term conflict with the United States but fearful of American military and economic might, both Russia and China have embraced more discreet means to undermine Washington.
Rather than challenge us militarily, they’re using “grey zone” measures, such as damaging critical infrastructure, to cause societal chaos and damage readiness without prompting painful retaliation.
The ripple effects of these efforts are readily apparent.
Taiwan’s Coast Guard reported this week that an undersea fiber-optic cable running between Taiwan and its outlying islands had been cut — severed, they alleged, by a ship crewed by Chinese nationals and backed by Chinese capital.
It was far from an isolated incident: In February 2024, a Chinese fishing boat dropped anchors on two undersea cables connecting Taiwan with its outlying island of Matsu.
Meanwhile, US officials warned in May that Chinese repair ships or advanced uncrewed undersea vehicles may also be tampering with undersea cables.
Russia has been a prime suspect in similar sabotage efforts in its own neighborhood. Confronted by NATO’s conventional military might, Moscow has embraced more subtle tactics to disrupt European security without triggering retaliation.
In December, a vessel in the Russian “shadow fleet” that evades Western sanctions allegedly dragged its anchor across one power cable and four communications cables connecting Finland, Estonia and Germany beneath the Baltic Sea, cutting them.
To counter this growing undersea threat, the United States and its partners must build resilience into the subsea cable infrastructure — a project that’s long overdue.
Washington can kickstart the process by cutting the red tape that delays undersea projects.
Five different federal agencies exercise jurisdiction over subsea cables: the Federal Trade Commission, Justice Department, Army Corps of Engineers, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission — in addition to state and local agencies.
Not surprisingly, the average duration of the US licensing process is two years, severely undercutting any effort to build redundant systems.
The federal government also needs to work with the private sector on methods of rapidly repairing and recovering damaged cables — an indispensable asset during a crisis.
Right now, cable repair is measured in weeks and months, not days.
Permitting and bureaucracy play a role, but the global subsea cable supply chain is a bigger part of the problem.
Rapid repair requires secure and diverse supply chains to get the specialized parts and tools needed.
Finally, allied and partner nation navies and coast guards in both Asia and Europe must also be more aggressive in patrolling cable areas and confronting adversary shipping as Moscow and Beijing increasingly share this malicious playbook.
In 2023, the United States launched the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience with Japan, Australia and India to strengthen submarine cable systems in the Indo-Pacific region and counter China’s security challenges. The Trump administration should take steps to maintain and strengthen that effort.
NATO has also made significant moves to improve deterrence in the Baltic and North Seas, increasing air and naval patrols and exercises there in response to Russian military exercises underwater at depths of 20,000 feet.
The alliance has also assigned its Joint Force Command Norfolk to monitor undersea threats and protect subsea infrastructure, and last year established a Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the UK.
Our national security depends on the globally connected critical infrastructure lying deep underwater.
The Trump administration must undertake a well-planned, well-organized, and well-funded effort to protect and extend that crucial network.
The alternative is to cede the seabed to Russian and Chinese sabotage.
Jack Burnham is a research analyst at the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
This story originally appeared on NYPost
