The situation in Niger remained fluid on Thursday, a day after members of the presidential guard detained President Mohamed Bazoum inside the presidential palace in Niamey. The rebellion has been condemned by the African Union and the UN as well as Western nations. FRANCE 24 spoke with Danielle Resnick, a political scientist specialising in sub-Saharan Africa at the Brookings Institution, about how a military coup could affect Niger’s relations with its regional and Western allies, and what it might mean for Russian influence on the African continent.
Niger’s army command on Thursday declared its support for a rebellion launched a day earlier by members of the presidential guard, saying its priority is to avoid destabilising the country. In a statement on behalf of military command, General Abdou Sidikou Issa said it “has decided to subscribe to the declaration made by the Defence and Security Forces … in order to avoid a deadly confrontation between the various forces”.
Earlier in the day, Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum posted on the X social media site – formerly known as Twitter – that he intended to protect the “hard-won” democratic gains made in a country that four coups since gaining independence from France in 1960. Niger’s minister of foreign affairs, Hassoumi Massoudou, seconded this, telling FRANCE 24 on Thursday that “there was an attempted coup, but of course we cannot accept it”. He also called for the president’s unconditional release and said talks with the rebelling soldiers were ongoing.
Bazoum, a former interior minister, took office in 2021, marking Niger’s first-ever democratic transition. Seen as one of the most pro-Western leaders in the Sahel, notably in the fight against Islamist insurgents, his detention drew quick condemnation from the UN as well as Western capitals.
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UN chief Antonio Guterres called Thursday for Bazoum to be released “immediately and unconditionally”, telling the soldiers to “Stop obstructing the democratic governance of the country and respect the rule of law.” French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna wrote on X that Paris “strongly condemns any attempt to seize power by force and joins the calls of the African Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to restore the integrity of Niger’s democratic institutions”. Germany’s foreign ministry said it was following events in Niger with “very great concern” and called for Bazoum to be released immediately, echoing an earlier statement from the White House urging ” elements of the presidential guard to release President Bazoum from detention and refrain from violence”.
FRANCE 24 spoke with Danielle Resnick, a political scientist specialising in sub-Saharan Africa at the Brookings Institution, to get an understanding of how the events in Niger could affect relations with its regional and Western allies, and what they might mean for Russian influence on the African continent.
FRANCE 24: This coup attempt has targeted the last pro-Western leader in the Sahel’s “three borders” area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. What does this mean for Western relations with Niger, which is seen as an important ally in the fight against jihadism?
Danielle Resnick: This attempted coup is a rapidly evolving event at the moment and so it is obviously difficult to speculate. Many are worried because French troops that had been stationed in Mali were sent to Niger, which was seen as the last bastion of democracy in the Sahel region. Niger has had its own history of coups, but eventually transitioned to democracy in 2021, which was seen as a turning point for this poor country prone to instability. The West had made much effort to bolster this democratic regime that has a number of valuable resources, because even once transitioned to democracy, there were many threats that it would be overturned. Because of Niger’s recent relative stability, transition to democracy, and pro-West orientation, it has been viewed as both a key partner in addressing humanitarian crises in the entire region and an important partner in addressing insurgent conflict across the Sahel. It is also seen as a last domino against military takeover and has many resources like uranium, which has been key for French energy needs.
It’s an open question whether this attempted coup is a manifestation of anti-Western sentiment or whether it is just an indication of internal [divisions] between President Bazoum, the presidential guard and the military. In April of this year, Bazoum replaced the army chief of staff and the head of the national gendarmerie, which led to some disgruntlement among officers. He has also tried to make some reforms to the presidential guard, which was set up by his predecessor, Mahamadou Issoufou, as a way of forestalling coups by the army. This technique of trying to prevent the army from overthrowing a president by setting up a parallel force has been used elsewhere, such as by the former Sudanese president, who set up the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) as a counterweight to the Sudan Armed Forces.
If the West decides to isolate the new regime, it is possible that it will turn towards groups like the Wagner group and Russia to support their efforts and gain legitimacy. I believe this would be catastrophic for any efforts to restore stability in the region because right now there is a confluence of junta governments, Islamic insurgents, and other non-state actors like Wagner in the Sahel that are involved in mineral extraction that are not at all concerned about maintaining democratic rule. The situation hinges on whether the military takes over and how much the West tries to isolate it or engage diplomatically with a military government to try to get it to return to civilian rule.
Niger has traditionally been a fragile state, one that hasn’t been able to exert its full power over all its massive territory. Niger has had a series of coups and several recent coup attempts. There was an attempt relatively soon after the current president was elected and a failed coup in 2015. However, these parallel military structures create jealousy over time. Although the military members who took part in this attempted coup claim they did so because of corruption and insurgent violence, a lot of signs point to Bazoum’s decision to remove General Abdourahmane Tchiani from command of the presidential guard, who was then able to get other military actors to support their actions in this coup.
One of the speculations is that General Tchiani, who was responsible for the failed 2015 coup, is also behind this coup, as Bazoum wanted to replace him as head of the presidential guard. He hasn’t appeared in the videos posted by the military personnel, but it’s possible that he’s been fuelling discontent and pushing for this coup.
It will be interesting to see whether this coup is addressed in the Russia-Africa summit currently taking place. How it is addressed and if it is acknowledged will give some early indication as to whether Russia sees this as an extra opportunity in the region.
How does this attempted coup impact the African Union, ECOWAS and other countries in the region?
This coup is a test for these institutions. However, they have already failed to exert much influence over its member states since the range of military coups in the Sahel that started in 2020 (Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022). ECOWAS claims it won’t recognise or allow military leaders to run in elections, and yet we’ve seen Mali recently pass a referendum which will allow military leaders to run in elections next year.
The African Union hasn’t had much influence in convincing member states to adhere to democratic norms. It has been unsuccessful in mediating in Sudan, as we’ve seen other powers take over that role. If Nigerian President Bola Tinubu – who is the current president of ECOWAS – is able to throw some weight around and encourage rapprochement between the military and civilian government, that would mark a turning point. But as of now, there is this feeling that ECOWAS doesn’t have much influence on the political and security trajectory of its member states.
Non-state actors aren’t concerned about the democratic norms that the African Union and ECOWAS are supposed to be supporting and maintaining. There is a gap between what these institutions are aspiring to and what they can and have achieved. A lot seems to be hinging on [Benin President Patrice] Talon’s visit to Niamey as a representative of ECOWAS. We may see that ECOWAS is able to interfere in some effective way by the end of today, but ECOWAS’s record has been patchy and it will be disappointing if they’re [once again] not able to mediate in this context.
Niger voted to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in a March 2022 UN resolution. However, could it decide to do what countries like Mali have done, and divest itself from Western powers, turning instead towards Russia?
It depends on the orientation of the military junta that takes over. It’s not necessarily a given that every military junta is going to be pro-Russia – there are variations in the degree of Russian influence across Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. And while Mali has allowed the Wagner Group to operate in providing training and engaging in combat operations against insurgents, discussions on this are still ongoing in places like Burkina Faso. It’s an open question. Typically, these military regimes have been pro-Russia as a way to get military support to deal with insurgent movements, and Niger has at least two in the southern part of the country. In the southwest, there is spillover from Mali and from groups allied with the Islamic State [group] and al-Qaeda. In the southeast, there is a spillover from Boko Haram.
So if it feels like there’s a security imperative and if the West is reluctant to support Niger with military support, it may be forced to engage with Russia and the Wagner Group, or potentially reach out to Rwanda, which has been operating as an important military partner across the continent (e.g., Mozambique and potentially in Benin).
As Niger has a lot of natural resources, it is also possible that Niger and Russia will develop a quid pro quo approach, [in which] Russia will provide military support in exchange for Niger allowing them to extract their natural resources. Whether a military junta in Niger would lean towards Russia would depend on how major stakeholders react … If the West takes a very restrictive and isolating approach, and if the French pull out their troops despite the country’s insurgent threats, then we might see a new junta government turning towards Russia for military support.
This story originally appeared on France24