
“The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker’s, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits,” Helme wrote. “The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn’t always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.”
Optimizely customers load a JavaScript “snippet” from Optimizely’s CDN onto their sites which contains Optimizely code, the customer’s A/B tests, and an optional field called Project JavaScript containing custom code written by the customer. The report said that attackers inserted their own code into the customer’s Project JavaScript and left the rest of each snippet untouched. “The file was still served from cdn[.]Optimizely[.]com, with Optimizely’s certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted,” it noted.
The report described how the observed attack worked. “The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a card number, expiry date and CVV,” it said. “When it has all three, it sends them to https://1688360[.]cc/card[.]php with navigator.sendBeacon. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes [such as] Stripe, Adyen and similar were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site’s own form fields were not.”
This story originally appeared on Computerworld
