Federal prosecutors have alleged that an Orange County technology executive, Jamshid Ghomi, 63, spent years supplying US equipment to Iran’s nuclear program and to entities linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Meanwhile, he enjoyed a comfortable life in Newport Coast, one of Orange County’s most exclusive enclaves.
The case exposes a blind spot in how America thinks about national security.
Ghomi, a 63-year-old dual U.S.-Iranian citizen, was taken into custody at his luxury ocean-view estate on charges of violating federal export controls, pulling back the curtain on what prosecutors describe as a highly coordinated exploitation of domestic commerce pipelines.
According to the unsealed federal criminal complaint, Ghomi spent more than a decade quietly anchoring a procurement network for Iran’s nuclear weapon program and its elite terrorist force.
The U.S. Department of Justice alleges that the operation began in 2011 with purchases through personal eBay and PayPal accounts before expanding into direct relationships with American suppliers.
Federal authorities also allege that between 2014 and 2018 alone, more than 275 tons of enterprise hardware moved through the network. They also allege that Ghomi was still negotiating direct purchases from US technology distributors as recently as 2023.
The mechanics described in the complaint were not particularly sophisticated. Hardware was allegedly routed through freight forwarders and intermediary companies in the United Arab Emirates. Shipping paperwork was altered. Commercial invoices were removed.
Investigators say advanced US components were concealed inside larger shipments before continuing on to Iran. Internal communications cited by prosecutors show participants referring to Iran simply as the “Motherland.”
Federal authorities also allege that more than $15 million moved through offshore entities connected to the operation between 2011 and 2024. Public reporting indicates that Ghomi claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit for multiple years while residing in a custom-built Newport Coast estate reportedly valued at $35 million.
The money connected to the operation allegedly moved through entities and accounts spanning the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Turkey and the UAE before ultimately reaching the United States.
Americans often associate hostile governments with cyberattacks, espionage operations and stolen secrets.
But the allegations against Ghomi describe something far more mundane: purchase orders, suppliers, freight companies, shipping manifests and wire transfers.
Federal prosecutors have brought similar cases in the recent past.
CA Post
In Houston, authorities charged a dual national accused of acquiring aircraft components and aviation technology destined for Iran through intermediaries in the Gulf.
In another California case, prosecutors alleged that advanced processors and communications equipment were purchased in the United States before being routed through third countries to customers in Iran.
The products were different. The companies were different. Yet the allegations followed a familiar pattern: American technology allegedly moved through commercial supply chains before reaching customers who could not legally purchase it directly.
Most immigrants come to the United States, build successful lives and contribute to the country. The overwhelming majority never come near an export-control investigation or sanctions case.
Prosecutors allege that Ghomi maintained substantial business ties in Iran while operating freely inside the United States. According to prosecutors, Ghomi lived, worked and prospered in Southern California while maintaining business interests tied to Iran.
The allegations describe someone who was already established inside the American economy, already conducting business and already participating in ordinary commercial life.
Newport Coast is known for ocean views, gated neighborhoods and multimillion-dollar homes. It is not a place most people associate with Iran’s nuclear program. Yet prosecutors allege that part of a procurement network serving institutions tied to that program operated from there.
For a country that spends enormous resources trying to keep sensitive technology away from hostile regimes, that fact is difficult to ignore.
Mr. Cohen is CEO of RealEye, a Tel Aviv-based security company.
This story originally appeared on NYPost
